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Physician's Abandonment of Patient
Plaintiff patient's petition alleged that the defendant physician, after
he had agreed to give plaintiff, who at this time was pregnant, the
necessary prenatal care to deliver her child and to give her the necessary
postnatal care, refused to visit plaintiff when her labor pains set in.
Instead, defendant advised and assured plaintiff's husband that plaintiff
would not have her baby until two weeks later. On later occasions,
defendant again refused to visit plaintiff and when urgently requested to
come at once to her bedside flatly refused and told plaintiffs husband
that he did not have to come and in fact would have nothing further to
do with plaintiffs case. Subsequently, the husband attempted to obtain a
physician but was unable to do so, thus plaintiff had to bear her child in
her home without the aid of any physician.'
The above factual situation represents an increasing problem in the
medical field: that of abandonment of one's patient. A recent case has
stated the theory as follows: "[a]n abandonment consists of a failure by
the physician to provide service to the patient when it is still needed in a
case for which the physician has assumed responsibility and from which
he has not been properly relieved."2 Stated another way "abandonment
of a patient is the unilateral severance by the physician of the professional relationship between himself and the patient without reasonable
-notice at a time when continuing medical attention is still a necessity."'
Two ideas become readily apparent from these definitions. First, is the
rule that a physician has a duty to treat a patient so long as the professional relationship between them lasts. It must be shown that at some
time during the course of the patient's present illness a relationship existed between the parties. A physician who has seen a patient for one
illness is not generally obliged to continue to treat the patient once the
treatment for that complaint is completed. He is not obliged to treat the
patient for succeeding illnesses unrelated to the first and is usually not
liable for abandonment if he refuses to do so.4 However, a physician
1. Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955).
2. Brandt v. Grubin, 131 N.J. Super. 182, 187, 329 A.2d 82, 87 (1974). See also
Clark v. Wichman, 72 N.J. Super. 486, 179 A.2d 238 (1962). For cases on the failure
by the physician to provide service to the patient when it is still needed, see Mucci
v. Houghton, 57 N.W. 305 (Iowa 1894); Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 261 N.W.
762 (1935); Nelson v. Farrish, 143 Minn. 368, 173 N.W. 715 (1919); Welch v. Frisbie
Memorial Hosp., 9 A.2d 761 (N.H. 1939); Burnett v. Layman, 133 Tenn. 323, 181 S.W.
157 (1915); Young v. Jordan, 106 W. Va. 139, 145 S.E. 41 (1928); Howell v. Biggart,
152 S.E. 323 (W. Va. 1930).
3. 3 Proof of Facts 2d, Abandonment of Patient,vol. 3, p. 123, Lawyers Co-oper
ative Publishing Co., Rochester, N.Y. (1974).
4. Skodje v. Hardy, 288 P.2d 471 (Wash. 1955).
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who is considered by the patient to be his family physician might be
guilty of abandonment if he is consulted in an emergency by the patient
and does not make a proper referral.5 The physician also has the right
to limit his relationship with the patient as long as the limitations are
made clear to the patient at the outset of the relationship and a refusal
to exceed the limitations does not constitute abandonment. 6
Thus, the physician-patient relationship is critical in assessing whether
or not a malpractice action resulting from abandonment will lie,' and is
the first element of proof in an abandonment case. If there is lacking a
contractual relationship, then an abandonment suit cannot be maintained. 8
The second idea to be gleaned from the definitions is that adequate
notice to the patient of withdrawal is extremely significant. Before a
physician makes his announced withdrawal effective he must allow
sufficient time for the patient to locate another physician who is willing
to accept the case.' Failure to give such notice and thereby exercise that
care required by law, will render the physician liable in tort.
Actually, there are two situations in which abandonment will occur.
First, is by breach of contract where there is a complete intentional
withdrawal from the case. Here determination of liability revolves
around whether the patient was given sufficient notice of the physician's
intent to withdraw. Second, abandonment occurs under negligence theory where the physician fails to observe the patient's problems with
sufficient care'0 to realize that further treatment is necessary so that the.
effect on the patient is an equally serious denial of treatment. In this
situation, as opposed to the first, there is no intention to abandon."
Even if abandonment can be proved to have occurred it should be
noted and emphasized that unless the act is the proximate cause of
damage to the patient, the amount of recovery is inevitably extremely
small. Thus, if a patient who has been abandoned consults another
physician promptly, thus causing minimal delay in necessary treatment
5. See supra note 3, at 126.
6. Rodgers v. Lawson, 170 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1948) geographical limitationsphysician did not make house calls; Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 744 (1931);

McNamara v. Emmons, 36 Cal. App. 2d 199, 97 P.2d 503 (1939).
7. "As a man consents to bind himself so shall he be bound."

3

ELLIOT ON CON-

TRAcTs § 1891 (1913).

8. See Shapira v. United Med. Serv., Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 200, 205 N.E.2d 293, 257
N.Y.S.2d 150 (1965).

9. See McManus v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 289, 127 N.W.2d 22 (1964); Burnett v.
Layman, supra note 2, at 325.
10. Sanders v. Lischkoff, 188 So. 815 (Fla. 1939); Beck v. German Klinik, 78 Iowa
696, 43 N.W. 617 (1889); Wambold v. Brock, 19 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa 1945); Johnson
v. Vaughan, 370 S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1963); Doan v. Griffith, 402 S.W.2d 855 (Ky. 1966);
O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., I1 App. Div. 2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960).
11. See supra note 3, at 124.
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and his recovery from his illness is not impeded, damages, except for
mental anguish, are usually minimal. A mere showing of negligence on
the part of the physician is not sufficient to sustain the action."2
Once the plaintiff decides to maintain an action against the physician,
he has certain elements of proof to maintain. First, as mentioned above,
he must prove that a physician-patient relationship existed, and this
proffer of proof will most likely include an agreement, express or
implied, 3 by the physician to treat the patient until the latter has
recovered. Second, the plaintiff must prove that there was a failure on
the part of the physician to attend the patient and that such abandonment damaged the patient's condition (proximate cause). In addition, if
the physician deviated from the normal standard of care, then it would
be beneficial to the plaintiff's case to prove such neglect.
Once the proof has been proffered and the trial has finally begun, the
question of expert testimony becomes a very interesting and important
consideration not only for trial purposes but also from the plaintiff's
point of view. As is well known, expert testimony is considered an
indispensable prerequisite to the establishment of liability on matters
concerning questions of due care and skill under particular circumstances. An exception to this long-standing rule arises in the area of
abandonment in a specific situation. Expert testimony is not essential to
the establishment of negligence on the part of the physician where the
matters complained of are of such common knowledge that they might
be fairly interpreted by the jury without the benefit of expert evidence.'
The case of Gross v. Partlow'5 states the rule thusly:
There are instances where facts alone prove the negligence and where
it is unnecessary to have the opinions of persons skilled in the particular science to show unskilled and negligent treatment. . . . It is
therefore not necessary that a case of malpractice be proved by direct
and positive evidence, and that it may be proved 'by a chain of circumstances from which the ultimate6fact required to be established is
reasonably and naturally inferrable.1
Thus, expert testimony will be required only where the nature of abandonment is extremely technical. Further, the fact that expert testimony is
12. A causal connection was held to exist in the following cases: Maltempo v.
Cuthbert, 504 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974); Lathrope v. Flood, 135 Calif. 458, 67 P. 683
(1902); Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., Inc., 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941);
Wilson v. Martin Mem. Hosp., 232 N.C. 362, 61 S.E.2d 102 (1950); Ricks v. Budge,
91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 683 (1902); Vann v. Harden, 87 Va. 555, 47 S.E.2d 314 (1948).
13. See Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159, 16 S.E. 564 (1892).
14. Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 432, 444 (1958).
15. 190 Wash. 489, 68 P.2d 1034 (1937).
16. Id. The jury naturally inferred that plaintiff was discharged before his condition justified it.
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not needed to make a prima facie case affords the plaintiff a distinct
advantage.
If the plaintiff is successful at trial in proving that the physician
abandoned him then what damages can he recover? Firstly, if the
patient is employed he can recover loss of income as the result of the
prolongation of the illness from which he would have recovered more
quickly had he not been abandoned. Secondly, the patient can recover
any decrease in permanent earning capacity. Thirdly, he can recover
medical expenses made necessary by the abandonment. Lastly, the
patient can recover for pain, suffering, fright and mental anguish caused
by the act. Damages for mental anguish are recovered more frequently
than for pain or fright because of the psychological
effects of being left
17
alone without assistance while incapacitated.
Though it may appear that the patient has a strong case against the
physician, the latter is not without his defenses when a claim of abandonment is maintained against him. The first claimed justification concerns an intervening illness of the physician. Such illness will excuse a
unilateral termination of the physician-patient relationship but only if
the physician notifies the patient of his inability to continue the treatment so as to give the latter a reasonable opportunity to secure another
physician or have the physician provide for a competent substitute. In
one case, Warwick v. Bliss,18 a physician, who had undertaken the
treatment of plaintiff's fractured leg, was obliged to leave the vicinity
because of his own ill health. However, he left plaintiff in the charge of
another physician who continued the treatment. The Warwick court
held that there was no ground for a complaint of abandonment where
there was nothing to show that the substitute physician was not equally
as capable and skillful as defendant or that plaintiff suffered in any
manner because of the change in doctors.'"
Lack of cooperation by the patient may be a second factor to justify
unilateral termination by the physician. If an office patient comes to the
physician's office and while there receives careful and skillful treatment,
but then fails to return for further treatment and in consequence thereof
suffers injury, the patient is not entitled to maintain an action against the
physician because of his own default and misfeasance. 2" The case of
17. There are more cases of abandonment against obstetricians than any other type
of medical practitioner because of the psychological factors involved. Thus, the physician's duty to an obstetrical patient is absolute. See Norton v. Hamilton, supra note
I; Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915).
18. 46 S.D. 622, 195 N.W. 501 (1923).
19. Id. at 504.
20. Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962), physician could not be
charged with having abandoned his patient where physician had instructed patient to return in two weeks and where patient and not physician had decided that the previous
visit would be patient's last; Dashiell v. Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 35 A. 1094 (1896); Urru-
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Fleishman v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.2 1 provides an interesting set of
facts in this area. There the patient claimed that the physician did not
warn her of the side effects of a certain drug and because of his failure
she continued to use the drug and subsequently developed cataracts. The
prescription itself only authorized two refills, but the plaintiff continued
to take the medication even after the prescription ran out. One year later
she stopped taking the drug because of a radio report she heard concerning its side effects. Plaintiff sued on the theory that a physician has a
continuing duty to make periodic calls to follow the progress of the
patient under his care and to notify the patient of the dangerous
propensities of a drug which he has prescribed as soon as he knows or
should have known of them. The court disagreed with plaintiff's contention and held that no abandonment had occurred. The court reasoned
that the patient herself dispensed with the physician's services and thus
terminated the relationship many months before the warning was heard.
The court also stressed the fact that she continued taking the drug after
the prescription expired, and once this expired the physician was no
longer under a duty to follow her progress.
However, in the case of Lathrope v. Flood2 2 a claim of lack of
cooperation by the patient was unsuccessful. There defendant was employed to attend plaintiff during her first pregnancy. He visited her at
various times and on the final visit he deemed it the proper time to
employ instruments to aid in the delivery of the child. The physician
attempted to deliver whereupon plaintiff shrank back causing the defendant to drop the instrument. Thereupon, defendant threatened the
plaintiff that if she did not cease screaming he would quit the case. He
attempted to employ the instruments two more times, however, the
patient failed to cooperate, so he abruptly left the house. One hour later
another physician was obtained and he found the plaintiffs condition
was not such as to require the use of instruments at that time. The court
in its decision made the following remarks: "[s]uch conduct [on the part
of the physician] evidenced a wanton disregard, not only of professional
ethics but of the terms of his actual contract."2 3 Further, the court stated
that the facts showed negligence in its character amounting well nigh to
brutality.2 4
Throughout the cases a problem has existed concerning whether or
not a physician is justified in abandoning the patient if the latter fails to
pay his bills. Invariably, the courts have held that failure of the patient
tia v. Patino, 297 S.W. 512 (Texas Civ. App. 1927), where the patient obstinately refused to follow the treatment prescribed by the physician.
21. 94 N.J. Super. 90, 226 A.2d 843 (1967).

22. 6 Cal. Unrep. 637, 63 P. 1007 (1901).
23. Id. at 637, 63 P. at 1008; See also Thaggard v. Vafes, 119 So. 647 (Ala. 1928).
24. Id. at 637, 63 P. at 1008.
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to pay for the physician's services does not justify the physician in
terminating the relationship at least where the patient still needs medical

attention.25 This involves an ethical problem. Is it within sound medical
practice for the physician to say "I am not going to take care of you until
that account is taken care of?" A physician's medical ethics would be
seriously questioned were he to act in such a manner.
When does the physician's obligation of continuing attention terminate? First, it is terminated by the cessation of the necessity which gave
rise to the relationship of physician and patient2 6 (recovery by the
patient), by mutual consent of the parties,2 7 by the discharge of the
physician by the patient,2" or by the physician's withdrawing from the
case after giving the patient reasonable notice so as to enable him to
29
secure other medical attention.

Another consideration which should not be neglected is the effect of
special or limited employment on the part of the physician. As in the
case of contracts generally such a limitation may become part of the
contract of employment either by an express provision to this effect or
by implication. It appears to be well settled that a physician who is
employed only for a specific occasion or service is under no duty to
continue his visits or treatment thereafter, and is consequently not liable
for abandonment if he ceases treatment of his patient after performing
the specific service.3 0
In the case of Brandt v. Grubin1 a patient visited the physician
25. Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675 (Common Pleas of New York City, Trial
Term 1891); Ricks v. Budge, supra note 12 (Folland dissenting).
26. See McGulpin v. Bessmer, 241 Iowa 1119, 43 N.W.2d 121 (1950); Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wash. 2d 257, 130 P.2d 341 (1942).
27. See Fortner v. Koch, supra note 2.
28. Brown v. Dark, 119 S.W.2d 529 (Ark. 1938), when a physician has been discharged by a patient he is relieved of responsibility if his treatment of the case was
proper up to the time of discharge. However, if after the discharge the physician volunteers and offers advice which deceives or misleads the patient, he is responsible for
injuries arising therefrom. Carpenter v. Blake, 75 N.Y. 12 (1818).
In addition, even though the patient terminates the relationship, if the situation is such
that medical care will be required, the physician has the duty to warn him of the necessity of obtaining further medical care and is obliged to provide the patient's succeeding
physician with sufficient information on the case to permit continuation of treatment.
For his own protection, the physician should write the patient a letter confirming the
discharge and asserting the need for continuing treatment. See Brandt v. Grubin, 131
N.J. Super. 182, 329 A.2d 82 (1974).
29. However, it is no excuse for a physician who agreed to treat one person that
at the time treatment became necessary he could not leave another patient. See Hood
v. Moffett, supra note 17; Young v. Jordan, supra note 2.
30. See Harris v. Fall, 177 F. 79 (7th Cir. 1910); McNamara v. Emmons, supra
note 6; Sheridan v. Quarrier, 127 Conn. 279, 16 A.2d 479 (1940); Miller v. Blackburn,
170 Ky. 263, 185 S.W. 864 (1916); Nelson v. Farrish, supra note 2; Nash v. Royster,
189 N.C. 408, 127 S.E. 356 (1925).
31. 131 N.J. Super. 182, 329 A.2d 82 (1974).
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whom the latter referred to a mental health clinic. Upon his recommendation, he sent a note home to the patient's family apprising them that
the patient needed psychiatric care. Subsequently, the patient committed
suicide, and the family sued the physician for abandonment. The court
rejected the abandonment claim, and reasoned that the visit was for a
specific purpose and after one visit the physician found, that because he
was a general practitioner and not a psychiatrist, he was incapable of
providing the requested services. The court further emphasized that the
patient was referred to a source of competent medical assistance and
therefore, the physician was liable neither for the actions of subsequent
treating professionals nor for his refusal to become further involved with
the case.
Many of the abandonment claims certainly do not appear to be just to
the physician especially where he takes a vacation or refuses to treat a
patient who fails to pay him. Thus, the physician should attempt to
avoid a claim of abandonment and subsequent liability by taking certain
steps in order to protect himself. First, the physician should make
proper provision for the attendance of a competent physician during his
absence in case of call. Second, he should not absent himself while his
patient is in critical condition. Third, if he feels that his caseload is too
demanding, then he should not accept a patient. 2 Fourth, he may limit
treatment and responsibility by special contract, treat only for a specfiic
ailment, or for a specific period of time. Fifth, the physician can limit
himself to office practice only, operations only, or consultation only.
Sixth, -he should be able to recognize when the relationship with his
patient terminates. This protection will substantially minimize premature discharges. Last, the physician should use his good common sense
by adhering to sound medical practice.
From a reading of the cases, it appears as though the use of the
abandonment theory by plaintiffs attorneys is increasing. The reasons
for the rise are reflected in the frequent elimination of expert testimony
and the merger of abandonment principles with contracts and negligence theories.
But what does the future hold for abandonment claims? Perhaps, on
the one hand, it is foreseeable that such actions will show a gradual
decline as the physician begins to make use of some of the protections
listed above. But this is very unlikely especially in light of the fact that
there are a shortage of doctors and an increase in the number of
patients. This lopsided ratio results in less time being spent with one
patient than is needed because of an overcrowded waiting room and
32. See Childers v. Frye, supra note 6; where defendant physician did not accept
drunken man as his patient.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1975

7

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1975], Art. 14

156

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

thus the strong chance of a faulty diagnosis. It must be accentuated that
the press of business is not a defense against abandonment claims.
Abandonment is extremely serious. Not only does it involve a breakdown of medical ethics and dedication to the field, but it also endangers
a human life. Therefore it is imperative to punish the offender more
harshly in the future by either assessing punitive damages against the
physician or revoking his license to practice medicine or instituting
criminal charges against him. Such actions might have a deterrent effect
on future charges of abandonment.
RICHARD ROSENTHAL

Criminal Aspects of Suicide in the United States
Suicide has been denounced as a great sin by some and eloquently
defended as a natural right of man, as early as 1644, by the English
cleric John Donne.' It has been a common and highly dramatic form of
death throughout the history of man. In 1972, there were 24,280
reported suicides in this country, which is equivalent to a 11.7 suicide
rate per 100,000 population.2 This number of suicides was almost
indentical to the number of homicides in the same year.' There is little
doubt that the suicide rate in the United States will increase in the
forthcoming years, if the historical correlation between times of economic trouble and an increased suicide rate continues.4 Suicide has become a
common form of death in the United States.
In dealing with the criminality of suicide, there are essentially three
basic areas of importance: the act itself, attempted suicide, and the act
of a second person aiding or encouraging a suicide. Each of these areas
will be examined in detail within the various jurisdictions of the United
States.
SUICIDE

At English common law, suicide was a felony with strict punishment
and considered an immoral crime.5 The punishment included a mutila1. J. Donne, Biathantos (1644).
2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, #86, Table
62 (1974).
3. Id.
4. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Table Series B-1t4-128 (1960).
5. Hales v. Petit, 1 Plowden 253, 75 Eng. Rep. 387 (1562); State v. Willis, 255
N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961).
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